L'articolo che segue è stato
pubblicato su una recente edizione della Rivista Tecnica dell'ANPAC
e contiene elementi che completano il quadro che intediamo fornire al
fine di stimolare la riflessione del professionista attento.
In altri articoli di questa edizione di airmanshiponline
abbiamo proposto i problemi
di interfaccia tra pilota e aeromobile. Con questo articolo proponiamo
aspetti culturali, in senso antropologico, che forniscono alcune ragioni
per capire i problemi con le macchine e con l'ambiente. Senza trascurare
il fatto che gli aspetti culturali hanno una influenza fondamentale
sui problemi di relazione tra i membri dell'equipaggio.
Why Your Flight Safety Is At The Mercy Of Cultural Factors
Dr Najmedin Meshkati
November 29, 2000
Najmedin Meshkati, Ph.D., CPE
Facts are not pure and unsullied bits of' information; culture also influences what we see and how we see it. Theories, more-over are not inexorable inductions from facts. The most creative theories are often imaginative visions imposed upon facts; the source of imagination is also strongly cultural.
[Dr. Stephen Jay Gould, renowned Harvard University professor of geology, biology, and the history of science (Gould, 198 1, p. 22).
Introduction
Whenever you fly an aircraft, seat in the cockpit or in the cabin,
or land in a "foreign" airport your flight safety is at the mercy of
cultural factors. Attesting is the above succinct epigraph, which only
provides the first compelling reason. It may be anathema to many scholars
and practitioners of "hard" sciences and other engineering-dominated
fields, but recent rigorous research has proven that even scientific
theories, facts, and practices - which determine and govern aviation
systems' operations - are strongly culturally based.
For instance, according to a recent article in The New York Times
(May 23, 2000), an attempt to ban communication in French
between pilots and air traffic controllers at Charles de Gaulle airport
near Paris lasted only 15 days primarily due to cultural factors, and
rnore specifically because of "stubborn Gallic pride that persists among
French pilots and air controllers." As all non French speaking seasoned
pilots who have approached this airport know, this decision could have
serious long-term safety implications.
Understanding the role of cultural factors in aviation safety is of
paramount importance, as the aviation industry will become even more
"international" in the near future, and as international traffic is
expected to continue providing a greater overall share of world air
transport. Boeing expects it to account for 54 percent of all air travel
in the next 20 years, with domestic traffic making up the other 46 percent
(Financial Times, May 21, 1994). This increasing trend heightens the
importance of aviation technology transfer from primarily Western aircraft
and systems manufacturers to some 600 airlines and air traffic control
centers in countries around the world.
Cultural Factors and Aviation Safety
The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), which is a specialized
agency of the United Nations, has acknowledged the critical importance
of cross-cultural issues in the aviation safety. According to Maurino
(1994), ICAO experience supports the conclusion that the effectiveness
of Human Factors training may be diminished or even denied altogether
by the context within which such endeavors take place (Smith, 1992).
The lessons from the ICAO Human Factors Programme have also shown that
"safety deficiencies that could be addressed by Human Factors training
in North America may not be effectively addressed at all by training
in other regions of the world" [emphasis added (Maurino, 1994, p. 174)].
Johnston (1993), Merritt (1994), and Merritt and Helmreich (1994) have
suggested that North American approaches to crew resource management
training may not be applicable in many cultures. According to Helmreich
(1994, p. 17), "this raises the important research question of how to
measure significant cultural differences and how to adapt training to
reflect them."
Cultural parameters constitute the dormant and, probably, the most subtle sub-set of human factors considerations in technology utilization. Therefore, not only should they be noted, but also, because of the increasingly 'international' nature of the aviation industry, they should be paid even higher attention in aviation safety. Cultural factors contributed significantly to the crash of Avianca flight 052 (AV052), the Airline of Columbia Boeing 707, in Cove Neck, New York, on January 25, 1990. As a result of this accident, 73 of the 158 persons aboard were fatally injured. According to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB):
"The NTSB determines that the probable cause of this accident was the
failure of the flight crew to adequately manage the airplane's fuel
load, and their failure to communicate an emergency fuel situation
to air traffic control before fuel exhaustion occurred" (emphasis
added; NTSB, 1991, p. 76).
"The world "priority" was used in procedures' manuals provided
by the Boeing Company to the airlines. A captain from Avianca Airlines
testified that the use by the first officer of the world "priority,"
rather than "emergency", may have resulted from training at Boeing
... He stated that these personnel received the impression
from the training that the words priority and emergency conveyed
the same meaning to air traffic control ... The controllers
stated that, although they would do their utmost to assist a flight
that requested "priority," the word would not require a specific
response and that if a pilot is in a lowfuel emergency and needs
emergency handling, he should use the word "emergency " (emphasis
added, p.63).
The NTSB concluded: "The first officer, who made all recorded radio
transmissions in English, never used the word "Emergency," even
when he radioed that two engines had flamed out, and he did not use
the appropriate phraseology published in United States aeronautical
publications to communicate to air traffic control the flight's minimum
fuel status" (emphasis added, p. 75).
Helmreich's (1994) comprehensive analysis of the AV052 accident has
thoroughly addressed the role of cultural factors. He contended that:
"Had air traffic controllers been aware of cultural norms that may influence
crews from other cultures, they might have communicated more options
and queried the crew more fully regarding the flight status ... The
possibility that behavior on this (flight) was dictated in part by norms
of national culture cannot be dismissed. It seems likely that national
culture may have contributed to (the crew's behavior and decision making)
... Finally, mistaken cultural assumptions arising from the interaction
of two vastly different national cultures (i.e.,crew and ATC) may have
prevented effective use of the air traffic control system" (parenthetical
statements added; p. 17).
In Helmreich's (1994) judgment, the important role the national culture
of Avianca's cockpit crew in that accident also should be considered:
"In a culture where group harmony is valued above individual needs,
there was probably a tendency to remain silent while hoping that the
captain would "save the day." There have been reported instances in
other collectivist, high power distance cultures where crews have
chosen to die in a crash rather than disrupt group harmony and anthority
and bring accompanying shame upon their family and in-group (emphasis
added, p. 17).
High Uncertainty Avoidance may have played a role (in this accident)
by locking the crew into a course of action and preventing discussion
of alternatives and review of the implications of the current course
of action. High Uncertainty Avoidance is associated with a tendency
to be inflexible once a decision has been made as a means of avoiding
the discomfort associated with uncertainty (p. 17).
Above conclusions have been corroborated, in principle, by several other
studies: an operator's culturally driven habit is a more potent predictor
of behavior than his or her intentions; and there could be occasions
on which intentions cease to have an effect on operators' behavior (Landis,
Triandis, and Adamopoulos, 1978). It should be noted that this fact
questions the effectiveness of those (safety-related) regulations and
procedures which are incompatible with operators' culturally-driven
habits.
The importance of the cultural factors for automation in the aviation
industry has been further highlighted by two recently published studies.
Helmreich and Merritt (1998), and Sherman and Helmreich and Merritt
(1977), in their study of national culture and flightdeck automation,
surveyed 5705 pilots across 11 nations and have reported that: "the
lack of consensus in automation attitudes, both within and between nations,
is disturbing" (p. 14). They have concluded that there is a need for
clear explication of the philosophy governing the design of automation.
Most recently, the United States Federal Aviation Administration Human
Factors Study Team (1996) issued a report entitled The Interfaces
Between Flightcrews and Modern Flight Deck Systems. This team identified
several "vulnerabilities" in flightcrew management of automation and
situation awareness which are caused by a number of interrelated deficiencies
in the current aviation system, such as "insufficient understanding
and consideration of cultural differences in design, training, operations,
and evaluation" (p. 4). They have recommended a host of further studies,
under the title of Cultural and Language Differences. They included
pilots' understanding of automation capabilities and limitations, differences
in pilot decision regarding when and whether to use different automation
capabilities, the effects of training, and the influence of organizational
and national cultural background on decisions to use automation.
Ethnic Variables, Cross-Cultural Issues and the Aviation Community
Traditionally more than any other industry, the aviation community
around the world has been sensitive to ethnic variables. [For a general
review of 'ethnic variables' in human factors refer to Chapanis (1974
& 1975).] However, until recently, attention was limited to considering
physical, anthropometric, and physiological characteristics, among all
of the ethnic variables of different user populations. One of the pioneering
and noteworthy studies of ethnic factors and their effects on the safety
and performance of different aviators has been conducted by Pierce (1963).
According to this work, Japanese pilots faced problerns when they had
to use an American full-pressure suit with a "good fit;" even the smallest-sized
suits were too long for many of the Japanese pilots. This triggered
an anthropometric survey of Japanese pilots involving measurements similar
to those taken for the United States Air Force Survey. Differences in
the amount of oxygen consumption of the pilots from different ethnic
backgrounds were also studied and taken into account in cockpit design.
It has traditionally been a requirement for American pilots to take
supplemental oxygen when flying in an unpresserized plane above 10,000
feet. Peruvian pilots, on the other hand, who are natives to high lands,
do not need the additional oxygen due to special development of their
lungs and cardiovascular systems. They could fly in comfort at 20,000
feet without the use of the oxygen equipment (Pierce, 1963).
The Airplane Safety Engineering department of Boeing Commercial Airplane
Group (BCAG) conducted an exhaustive analysis of hull loss accidents
for western built commercial jet transport over 60,000 Ibs (27,216 kgs)
worldwide, for the period of 1959 through 1992. According to this work
(BCAG, 1993, p. 58), there was "strong correlation" between accident
rate and two cultural indices (i.e., Individualism and Power Distance).
This fact led the BCAG to recommend that "this is an area that needs
further analysis. The industry must continue its efforts to identify
the cultural impacts on aviation safety" (p. 61).
Airline executives and airplane manufacturers have also acknowledged
the importance of cultural variables (Graeber, 1994). Mr. Robert A.
Davis (1993), Vice President of Engineering and Product Development
of Boeing Commercial Airplane Group, in his Keynote Address to the Annual
Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, entitled "Human
Factors in the Global Marketplace" (October 12, 1993, Seattle, Washington)
referred to "Diverse cultures" as one of six "Human Factors Challenges"
facing his industry. He stated, "Successful penetration of future growth
markets will require us to do better at taking into account the culture
that our customers' employees and passengers bring to our airplanes.
Furthermore, our designs must span a wide range of human abilities across
these cultures" (p. 9).
Important Culturally Based Parameters Affecting Organizational Functioning, Technology Utilization and Aviation Safety
The following issues and examples attempt to demonstrate some important culturally-based behaviors affecting organizational functioning, technology utilization, and particularly aviation safety (adopted from Meshkati, 1996, 1994, 1989; Kofler and Meshkati, 1987):
- Risk Perception.
- Attitude Toward Work.
- Work Group Dynamics.Attitude Toward Technology.
- Attitude Toward Organization, Hierarchy, Procedure, and Working Habits.
- Attitude Toward Time and Time of the day.
- Religious Duties and Their Effects on Work.
- Achievement Motivation and Orientation.
- Population Stereotype (e.g., Color Association).
- The "if it ain't broke, don't fix it" attitude.
Conclusion
In summary, behavior analysis models and theories which are developed in one country reflect the cultural characteristics of that country and may not be fully applicable to other countries. Therefore, an organization that transfers technology to a country with a different culture should attempt to be fully adaptive to the host country's cultural dimensions (Demel and Meshkati, 1989).
Research has demonstrated that that technology utilization, without the incorporation of the necessary human factors and cultural considerations, is doomed to failure (Meshkati and Robertson, 1986). It is incumbent upon the world's airlines and aviation industry (aircraft and equipment manufacturers, air traffic controllers, and civil aviation authorities) to systematically take into account the physical and psychological factors, as well as the cultural attributes of their user populations, in the design and operation of passenger aircraft and aviation systems. Cultural factors have a significant effect on the realities of operating a complex technology such as modern aviation, and the nature of these effects must be understood and accommodated if aviation systems are to operate safely. As noted by the late Nobel physicist Richard Feynman (1986), in reference to the Space Shuttle Challenger explosion:
For a succesful technology, reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled.
Najmedin Meshkati is a professor of engineering at the University of Southern California (USC), Los Angeles, California. He is a Fellow of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society; a Certified Professional Ergonomist; and a recipient of the Presidential Young Investigator Award from the United States National Science Foundation. He is the ex-Director of the School of Engineering Continuing Education program, which included: The 48-year old USC Aviation Safety Program, Transportation Safety Program, and Process Safety Management Program. He conducts research on human and organizational errors in complex technological systems.
